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How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
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How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.
How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by 'believe'. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of 'what our names are, where we were born, whether we're currently in front of a screen'. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon---it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, we might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of 'full belief' intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.